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The Multinational Corporation 
and Industrial Relations: 
The European Approach 
Paul Malles 
The author considers whether the multinational cor-
poration constituted a challenge to the industrial relations 
Systems as they hâve developed in Europe over the last 
quarter of a century and what response such a challenge 
found in the trade-union movement. 
There has been, in récent years, a fast-growing literature on the 
subject of the international or multinational corporations. What I hâve 
seen, however, indicates that among the many facets which are or hâve 
been under study, the industrial relations aspects hâve, as yet, found 
little attention. 
There is this point also : The question of the multinational corpo-
ration threatens to become one where émotions nourished by preconceived 
ideas are taking precedence over facts, especially as the facts are hard 
to establish and the whole issue is surrounded by a web of what Raymond 
Vernon called « facts, fears and fancy ». To some, the multinational 
corporation constitutes the epitome of compétitive efficiency and the rea-
lization of the idéal of Ricardo and Smith in their revolt against the 
économie nationalism of the mercantilist period, namely that each nation 
should specialize in those things it does to the best advantage with a 
minimum of restriction and interférence ; and on the other side, there 
are those who see in the multinational corporation only another addition 
of monopolies and oligopolies to the already imperfect market mechanisms 
of international trade. 
Obviously, the one does not 
exclude the other, and the multi-
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national corporation like ail institutions may well hâve the virtues of its 
vices and the vices of its virtues. However, for our subject we do not need 
to deal with the question whether or not the multinational corporation is 
« good » or « bad », but whether or not it constitutes a challenge to the 
industrial relations Systems as they hâve developed in Europe over the 
last quarter of a century, and the response such a challenge finds in 
the trade-union movement. 
One of the first obstacles we hâve to overcome when talking about 
the multinational corporation is to agrée on what we are talking about : 
there is no readily accepted définition of this phenomenon. This is not 
astonishing, as most likely there are as many types of such corporations 
as there are multinational corporations and often at différent stages of 
institutional development. Raymond Vernon in an article significantly en-
titled « Economie Sovereignty at Bay » says this : 
« The term 'multinational enterprise' is sometimes confusing and 
always imprécise ; but what I hâve in mind is simply a cluster of 
corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common 
ownership and responsive to a common management strategy. That 
kind of définition serves well enough to characterize Ford or Nestlé, 
IBM or Philips » 1. 
(You may notice that two of thèse firms are « American » and two 
« European ».) In fact, while the growth of subsidiaries of American-
based multinational corporations in Europe has given the discussion there 
a distinct flavour, the so-called « European Companies » form now a 
large part of the family of multinational corporations, even infiltrating 
the United States. 
J. N. Behrman in a short paper prepared for the Economie Council 
of Canada says the following : 2 
«There is no accepted définition of an 'international corporation' 
and the concept is likely to remain confused because of the différent 
meanings of the term 'international'. It is not clarified by the sub-
stitution of the word 'multinational'... There are no truly intern-
ational companies. Attempts in business journals to define an intern-
ational corporation (the terms are used interchangeably) as a Com-
pany that makes no national distinctions in coming to business dé-
cisions - balancing ail alternatives on a cost/return basis from ail 
i VERNON, Raymond, « Economie Sovereignty at Bay », Foreign Affairs, 
October 1968, pp. 110-122. 
2
 BEHRMAN, J. N., « An Essay on Some Aspects of the International Corpor-
ation », Economie Council of Canada, January 1970. 
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over the world - simply do not reflect parent company policy at 
présent.. . Even so, there is such a thing as international company 
- if characterized simply as a large (domestic) corporation which 
has a substantial overseas investment in operating subsidiaries or 
affiliâtes - sometimes including licensees ». 
Behrman is quite aware that the number of the companies over the world 
engaged « internationally » under that définition would undoubtedly run 
into the thousands. However, it is above ail the large « international » 
corporation on which attention is usually focussed and — as Biehrman 
also points out — among the 500 largest companies in the noncommunist 
world, only about half would be considered significantly « international » 
in the above sensé. In any case, we will do well to keep Behrman's qua-
lification of the multinational corporation as a domestic corporation with 
subsidiaries or affiliâtes and/or licensees in a number of countries firmly 
in mind when we corne to the question of the developing strategy of the 
European unions in dealing with them. 
Now, if we take a closer look at thèse définitions, I think everybody 
will note that they tell us little that's new. Multinational enterprises of 
one kind or another hâve been with us for a long time and the économie 
historian can go far back in European économie history and find chal-
lenge and response to them. 
So — we may well ask : « What's new ? », « What is the sudden 
shouting ail about?». I would like to single out three facts that are 
« new » : 
1) The sheer growth of the multinational or international corpora-
tion as a phenemenon of the 1960's. This growth is not so much 
one of numbers as of the accelerated rate of growth in invest-
ment, production and sales. Within the industrialized West, this 
rate of growth far outpaces that of the average rate of the na-
tional économies concerned. Behrman estimâtes a « conserva-
tive » growth rate of 10 per cent per annum for the corporations 
against an average 4 per cent national growth rate. This could 
mean — unless there is a reversai or slowdown, for example by 
a reassessment by governments of the impact on their économie 
policies — that « in 20 years the international corporative sector 
could easily equal in size the American Gross National Product 
or that of the rest of the noncommunist world, accounting for 
half of its Gross National Product compared with about 15 per 
cent currently ». 
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2) A change in the very nature of management, which itself is the 
conséquence of technological developments in communication and 
computerization permitting the establishment of centrally arrived 
at policies which then are locally applied. In other words, the 
management of the subsidiary or affiliated firm loses its « pleni-
potentiary » character and how much or how little decision-
making powers remain with it is no longer a matter of externa-
lities, but a matter of centrally established policies. This has 
already a strong effect upon managerial behaviour which may 
indeed become truly « international », where the nationality of 
local management matters little and the various national mana-
gers of international corporations become more and more closely 
identified with each other rather than with their domestic 
confrères. 
3) Thirdly, this rapid expansion of the multinational corporation 
plus the change in the structure and nature of management runs 
directly counter to the concurrent growth and concept of what, 
for want of a better word, we call the « Welfare State ». In his 
1958 Yale lectures — and long before the présent excitement 
about multinational corporations — the Swedish economist and 
social scientist Gunnar Myrdal noted the essentially nationalistic 
or if we wish to use a more euphonious word, the inward-
directed character of the Welfare State : 3 
€ . . . no logical dividing line can be drawn between, on the one hand, 
those policy measures which were in the nature of protective action 
against acute dangers for the national economy arising out of the 
sphère of international relations, and, on the other, the Welfare State 
policies proper. . . 
« Indeed, national planning - whether by the state, by public, semi-
public, or private organisations, or by individual enterprises - had for 
many reasons, almost by necessity, an autarkic tendency... 
« In particular, the ideals of the Welfare State did not permit intern-
ational adjustments in response to changes in the international sphère, 
if they had to be at the expense of full employment and other 
essential éléments of thèse ideals. As those ideals increasingly mat-
erialized in firm institutions and working practices which could not 
be easily and rapidly altered, the State was also less able to adjust 
them, even in situations where thèse ideals would hâve permitted 
it to do so. The national économies hâve been permanently shaped 
3 MYRDAL, Gunnar, « Beyond the Welfare State» Bantam Books Reprint, 1967, 
p. 133 ff. 
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towards a maximum of internai adjustability - within the framework 
of fixed rules and procédures adapted to the fulfilment of the ideals 
of the Welfare State - which makes it increasingly possible to pré-
serve internai progress and stability, but only at the cost of a more 
pronounced lack of extemal flexibility...» 
What we hère hâve to observe, I submit — and above ail within 
the context of European industrial relations — is an entirely new dimen-
sion to the old issue of économie sovereignty. The conscientious économie 
historian may object that neither government intervention in the economy 
nor « planning » is something new but was, for example, the hallmark 
of mercantilism. But there is a différence. First, the nature of the specifi-
cally goal-directed intervention : full employment, sustained growth, price 
stability, viable balance of payments and équitable distribution of rising 
incomes ; and, secondly — as agreement on a spécifie set of goals does 
not imply agreement on their priorities — the attempts to harmonize the 
conflicts of interest within specifically created institutions. Central to this, 
then, are industrial relations : the full employment concept enters into 
législation. Indeed the right to employment became regarded as a civil 
right, and collective bargaining — centralized in an organization-to-
organization relationship between management and organized laibour — 
became for better or worse subordinate to global national policies in the 
development of which the labour market parties of the private sector are 
directly involved 
Let me hasten to add hère, that I do not see in the concurrent de-
velopment of international institutions, be it GATT, or the International 
Monetary Fund, or the OECD, or even the European Common Market, 
a contradiction to the basically « nationalistic » concept or « économie 
sovereignty » concept, of the European Welfare State. Whatever the ideals 
which inspired their création, surely any observer of their development 
must admit that hitherto they hâve been little more than bartering places 
of national interests, and that ail « internationals » — and I do not 
exclude trade union internationals — are internationals of nationalists and 
not internationals of internationalists. 
If we then consider the rôle played by the European trade union 
movement and its political allies — the political power factor is never 
to be neglected on the European industrial relations scène — in the 
development and the institutionalization of the Welfare State, then we 
may well appreciate the fears and concerns that the very elusiveness of 
the multinational corporation in regard to national policies and institu-
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tions hâve created ; concerns which go much further than the question 
of « good » or « bad » employers, or individual instances of contract 
negotiations or industrial conflict, however dramatic and eye-catching 
such instances may be. As a working paper of the Secrétariat of the 
International Confédération of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) put it : 4 
« . . . the area in which the highly diversified world-wide corporation 
opérâtes is largely outside the scope of national sovereignties and 
by virtue of this fact, a sort of vacuum has been formed in the sphère 
of législation and régulation which must be filled>. 
Despite this fear and concern, there is nevertheless a certain ambi-
valence in the European trade union attitude to the multinational corpo-
ration. Indeed, the just-quoted document leans far more backward in 
its récognition of the positive aspects of the multinational corporation 
than many nontrade unionists may be inclined : 
« . . . at technical and financial levels, in the field of efficiency and 
performance, the development and installation throughout the world 
of giant highly diversified corporations incontestably présents nu-
merous advantages and certainly corresponds to a form of économie 
progress geared to the second half the 20th century.. . 
« Nobody would dream of disputing the positive aspects of the phe-
nomenon - the workers trade unions least of ail, in favour as they 
are of gênerai économie progress and the growth of production which 
are the fundamental means of raising the worker's standard of 
living... 
« Nevertheless » - adds the ICFTU paper - « concomitant with the 
récognition of the positive and bénéficiai aspects, it is also fitting to 
consider the transformation which they bring to the fabric of éco-
nomie, social, judical and political relations in which they develop. 
// is, therefore, appropriate to consider the adaptation necessary for 
their smooth development ». 
It is always quite interesting to note what happens to a secrétariat 
document when it reaches the floor, and, therefore, I quote hère from 
the subséquent resolution of the Ninth World Congress of the ICFTU 
on « Multinitional Corporations and Conglomérâtes » 5. 
Hère too we find a complimentary référence to the rôle of the 
multinational corporations in économie progress, but well qualified by a 
long list of criticisms and accusations such as : Jeopardizing démocratie 
national development planning ; arbitrarily transferring production facilities 
and research centres from one country to another without regard to 
4 Economie and Social Bulletin, Vol XVII, No. 2, March-April 1969. 
5 Economie and Social Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 4, July-August, 1969. 
70 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 1 
balanced global and régional development ; evading taxes by means of 
internai transfers at artificial priées between subsidiaries . . . and restric-
tions imposed on production and export opportunities ; inducing compé-
tition between the host countries by means of tax reliefs, public financing 
and other concessions ; undermining established industrial Systems ; 
exploiting international labour cost differentials in order to boost profits, 
etc., etc. 
In conséquence — and hère too I can only quote from this lengthy 
and explicit document the most salient points — the ICFTU urges the 
need to ensure that the priorities of national économie planning are 
respected, in particular that company mergers be subjected to the approval 
of public authorities, and that ail measures are taken in good time to 
avoid social hardships caused by structural change and plant elosure, 
and . . . 
« that any new laws or régulations governing international, régional 
or national opérations of multinational corporations must inclucle 
the principles which provide full scope for the requirements of max-
imum social progress in a balanced economy », and 
« emphasizes the need for adéquate measures to establish démocratie 
control at each level of décision, so as to advance the democratization 
of multinational corporations and in particular avoid undermining, 
or preventing, the extension of established practices and procédures 
for achieving effective industrial democracy in various countries ». 
What now is the strategy of the European unions in implementing 
the principles of this resolution ? What are the practical steps they are 
taking ? Hère I should add that I am speaking above ail of the unions 
affiliated to the ICFTU and its associated Trade Secrétariats (ITS), not 
only because they group the bulk of organized labour in Europe, but 
because there is no différence of opinion and policy but in fact consistent 
coopération between them and the Christian unions of the World Confé-
dération of Labour and its trade fédérations. Moreover, it is also quite 
clear that the impetus in the whole matter of multinational corporations 
in Europe cornes from the trade union centres and their affiliâtes in the 
countries of the Common Market ; this is not surprising as they find 
hère a ready-made framework of référence in an international setting. 
Thèse stratégies — ail still very tentative and expérimental as they 
may be — can be grouped under three headings : 
— adaptations in organizational structures ; 
— adaptations in the techniques of collective bargaining and conduct-
ting industrial conflict ; and 
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— adaptations sought within national as well as international law 
and within intergovernmental organizations — to fill « the 
vacuum of législation and régulation » concerning multinational 
corporations. 
Significantly, the EEC unions in April 1969 decided to convert the 
former so-called « Trade Union Secrétariat of the Six » into a « European 
Confédération of Free Trade Unions » (ECFTU). The initiative to this 
step came as far as I could ascertain from the German Trade Union 
Fédération (DGB). What it implies in practice is as yet difficult to say. 
But we can well assume that the German unions with their strong 
emphasis on « codetermination » are pressing forward to participation 
in managerial décisions of multinational or « European Corporations » 6 
with a greatly strengthened voice of the unions in the Common Market 
institutions. 
However, the most significant development can be surmised from 
the draft constitution : the composition of the tri-annual congress of the 
Confédération will be decided with considération for the numerical strength 
of each individual national centre ; the decision-making process of the 
congress and the executive committee will be based on the majority 
System and — most important — « the proposed voting process will 
make possible clear and binding décisions whilst giving due considération to 
the necessity of not reflecting a one-side majority.» 7 
At the ITS level, the most immédiate impact is that of the Inter-
national Métal Workers Fédération (IMF), particularly in the automotive 
and electrical and electronic fields, and the International Chemical and 
General Workers Fédération (ICF). The reason for this is quite obvious 
as the multinational giants — whether American or European based — 
6
 To overcome one of the main obstacles to économie intégration in Europe, 
namely the multiplicity of, and the différence between national légal System, the 
European Economie Commission proposes to create a new légal institution, the 
« European Limited Company ». The EFCTU unions agreed to submit to the Europ-
ean Economie Community certain proposais which foresee the establishment of a 
« Supervisory Council » in such companies of a tri-partite character, in that they 
would consist of « persons nominated as candidates by the gênerai assembly of the 
shareholders, persons nominated as candidates by those trade unions which are 
représentative at the European level and persons co-opted by the two other groups 
and representing the interests of the gênerai public ». Cf. BRAUN, Walter, « The 
European Company» in Free Labour World, No. 240, June 1970, pp. 15-17. 
7
 As possibly the first affiliate of the EFCTU, the Netherlands Fédération 
of Trade Union (NVV) adopted at its 1970 convention an article in its constitution 
corresponding to this décision, thus subordinating under certain safeguards its 
national autonomy to the international organization. 
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are primarily found in thèse fields, where concentration, mergers and 
acquisitions hâve been proceeding with rapidly increasing pace. 
Not forgotten should also be the International Transport Workers 
Fédération (ITF) which for décades had to deal with and develop its own 
techniques concerning certain types of internationally enmeshed corpo-
rations in maritime transport, especially with the pernicious issue of the 
« flags of convenience », the international airlines, and directly and 
indirectly with the international oil companies. 
The pioneer in the field of organizational adaptation to multinational 
manufacturing firms is undoubtedly the International Métal Workers 
Fédération (IMP). I recall meetings as early as 1958, when the late 
Walter Reuther first drew attention to the problem faced by the unions 
in industries which he then called — I quote from memory — « industries 
of equal technological development but wide disparities in wages, fringe 
benefits and other cost factors. » 
Moreover, this Trade Secrétariat groups the most well-organized 
and wealthiest unions in the world, and in particular under the impetus of 
the UAW, has made it possible to augment its staff, create compétent 
research facilities and generally energize its activities. 
Now — in regard to changes in organizational structure, the important 
point is that within the framework of the IMF's Automotive Department, 
world-wide councils hâve been set up according to enterprises, i.e. Ford, 
General Motors, Chrysler and Volkswagen-Benz in the first instance, 
to which now are being added British Leyland Motors and jointly Toyota 
and Nissan. Councils for Renault-Peugeot and Citroen-Fiat are now in 
préparation. (For reasons of the ideological and political splits in France 
and Italy, there are obvious difficultés.) 8 
In the electrical and electronics fields, because of the greater number 
of companies, the IMF proceeded in a somewhat différent manner ; 
that of « committees on multinational companies » which appear to be 
more regionally oriented. 
Obviously, as thèse examples show, the organizational adjustment 
which is now taking place dépends on the nature of the industry or 
industries concerned, and therefore will differ from ITS and even within 
one ITS. Essentially, however, thèse organizational changes and adaptations, 
« Another ITS, the International Fédération of Petroleum and Chemical Wor-
kers, which deals in the main with the international giants of the petroleum industry, 
adopted recently a similar System of enterprise councils. 
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whether at the level of the international fédérations of national centres 
or of those of the affiliated unions, aim at the same purpose, namely the 
« internationalization " of trade union strategy, at the national level in 
matters of collective bargaining and the solution of conflict situations, and 
at the national and international level at protective law by national as 
well as international législation. 
This is still far removed from true international joint bargaining 
with multinational corporations. However, there are a few examples where 
union représentatives hâve been able to come face to face with top officers 
of multinational corporations. To my knowledge the first firm which 
agreed to such meetings was Philips ; the first meeting taking place in 
1967 and the second in 1969 9. Both were essentially information meetings 
and both concerned Philips enterprises within the Common Market. 
According to the IMF, it is too early to assess the practical results on the 
spécifie basis of thèse international management-union meetings, but the 
IMF is prepared to give crédit to thèse meetings in preventing the closing 
of a plant in West Berlin and to Philips' agreeing to introduce an early 
warning System in case of production transfers from one country to 
another. 
Another interesting meeting took place between IMF delegates and 
the Swiss-based Brown-Boweri concern which employs about 88,000 
workers in 17 countries, nine of them in Europe. The meeting took place 
at the moment when this concern planned to set up in 1970 a new World-
wide management structure, co-ordinating research and technical develop-
ment, grouping middle and smaller plants under central management with 
an international personnel office, and creating an international management 
board with direct management représentation for the large companies in 
Switzerland, Germany and France. 
Topics of discussion were the Brown-Boweri production program, 
the division of manufacturing, future employement prospects and the pos-
9 A third meeting with Philips management took place in 1970 and agreement 
was reached on a ten-point program for its European plants. The main points of 
the agreement are récognition that problems arising from change can only be over-
come to the satisfaction of workers in discussion and negotiations at ail levels ; 
plant, national and European ; that both sides considering it essential to enter into 
early consultation whenever it is proposed to put into effect économie or technical 
measures having appréciable social conséquences ; acceptance of the principle that 
redundancies will be avoided ; that earnings and social benefits during retraining 
and transfer will be guaranteed and maintained at their previous levels for a 
minimum of six months and that workers over fifty years of âge will be specially 
protected. 
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sible effects of management structure on world-wide employement policy. 
The IMF news bulletin reporting on this meeting adds at this point : « The 
frank exchange of views was considered by both sides and will provide 
a basis for further contacts at international level through the IMF 10 ». 
Another meeting, which I would like to mention hère for illustration 
purposes although it appears not to hâve a direct bearing on multinational 
corporations, was an international tripartite meeting in February 1970 
between the ship-building unions of the European Common Market 
countries and the corresponding employers, under the chairmanship of a 
member of the European Commission with ambassadorial rank,, Thèse 
discussions took place on the basis of reports submitted by both employers 
and unions to the Commission, and the agenda included such items as 
the outlook for production and future development of demand, forecasts of 
manpower requirements, problems of older workers, development of craft 
qualifications, training, etc. I mention this as a possible avenue for 
elevating industrial relations to the international level by contacts between 
spécifie groups of workers and spécifie groups of employers under inter-
governmental auspices, which could become applicable to multinational 
corporations. 
Certain techniques are also developping which, while by no means 
involving international bargaining, yet arise from spécifie local situations 
and are then «internationalized by seeking to generalize the issues to the 
subsidiaries of the individual countries ». This technique was used with 
great success by the International Chemical and General Workers 
Fédération (ICF) in the now famous case of the glass-producing 
multinational company Saint Gobain, which may well become a classic 
in its way. 
However, one should be careful not to corne to hasty conclusions 
as to the applicability of the union strategy employed in that case to other 
situations and particularly other industries. As a research study of the 
British Fabian Society points out n : 
10 In September 1970 a further meeting between IMF affiliâtes from Germany, 
France, Italy, Austria, Norway and Switzerland and Brown-Boweri management 
took place. The main points of discussion were location of future investment, plans 
for production changes and likely areas of expansions, social security, training and 
occupational mobility, as well as the continuation and extension of scientific research 
and development in the BB establishments outside Switzerland. Perhaps the most 
important point was the agreement to meet at least annually and in the case of 
spécial problems even more frequently. 
n Fabian Research Séries 279 : « Politics and the Multinational Company », 
December 1969, p. 21. 
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«ICF is imlikely to prove a model which many industries can copy 
as it is operating in a highly capital intensive well integrated industry, 
which is relatively easy to organize, since a few men can do a lot of 
harm to a company, and chemical firms hâve a tradition of paying 
over the odds to avoid labour problems». 
The technique used in the Saint Gobain case dépends on careful 
timing, but above ail, on highly disciplined solidarity action. 
Speaking of solidarity action : certain instances hâve recently received 
some attention in the press, such as the solidarity action of British 
workers in the Dunlop situation. But to this, many others could be 
mentioned and they are by no means new. Eamon Park in a récent letter 
to the Globe and Mail quite rightly pointed out that they are far from 
c unprecedented ». And this goes for many other forms of pressure on 
multinational corporations. Just as there is nothing intrinsically new with 
multinational corporations, neither are many forms of trade union action 
although the public may only become aware of them in a crisis situation. 
However, those who know the international trade union movement also 
know that in the prévention of such crises, there is often at work some-
thing which may be called « quiet diplomacy » : interventions through 
national centres and unions, directly or via government and both, via 
employers associations etc., etc. at the point of final decisions-making. 
In fact, such interventions hâve for long been the daily bread — if not 
the butter — of international trade union secrétariats, sometimes with 
success and sometimes without. But neither party in such situations had 
any interest to shout from the house-tops and for the very good reason 
of not diminishing the usefulness of the channels used, or where publicity 
would hurt the chances to obtain concessions and agreement. 
Let me now sum up the essential points which are émerging from my 
previous remarks, and then comment on them individually : 
(i) the « internationalization » of union strategy involving multi-
national corporations dépends on intensive research concerning 
économie conditions, development trends, particular situations 
of the corporations and their subsidiaries, the knowledge of 
their interrelationships, profit developments, wages and working 
conditions in considérable détail ; this could include the storing 
and constant revision of information in electronic data banks ; 
(ii) the quick transmission of this information to the unions involved 
in a bargaining situation and the ço-ordination of policies and 
stratégies employed in individual situations — in other words, 
the « internationalization » of domestic bargaining ; 
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(iii) increasing opportunities for face-to-face meetings with the 
decision-making management officiais of the multinational 
corporations, if not for direct bargaining, but for exploration 
of issues and agreement on basic policy principles ; 
(iv) co-operation of governments in creating and developing 
institutions that will permit the removal of existing gaps in 
laws and régulations, not only at the national, but above 
ail the international level. 
Now as to comments : 
To carry out the intensive and continuing research program which 
is envisaged, a very radical change in the attitudes and concern of national 
trade union bodies in relation to the international organizations will hâve 
to take place. Most of thèse organizations, if not ail, are still understaffed, 
especially with professionally trained personnel, and under-financed. True, 
those who know the international trade union movement from the inside 
can tell stories about how much has been achieved by a handful of people 
and with ridiculously small amounts of money. Nevertheless, if inter-
national trade union bodies are to deal with multinational corporations 
in the electronic âge, a good deal of the old habits would hâve to change. 
One aspect of this problem is also the very great difficulty faced 
by unions — and for that matter governments — in obtaining information 
on the policies of multinational corporations. For the unions, that goes for 
wage policies as well as many other aspects of company policies affecting 
jobs, working conditions and living standards such as investment programs, 
technological change, lay-offs, plant closures, etc. Most European trade 
unions hâve been able, either by law or by agreement, to exercise 
considérable influence on managerial décisions. What they fear most is 
an « absentée » management removed from their influence on decision-
making. By no means will ail multinational corporations reveal what their 
policies are, or even whether they hâve any centrally arrived at, universally 
applicable, industrial relations policy. 
One multinational corporation which publicly stated that it had 
« in writing » such a policy happens to be a Canadian-based firm, Massey-
Ferguson, described by its Président in an interview with Business Week 
(June 1968) as : 
« a company with both global discipline and global attitudes. Such 
phrases as « foreign » and « domestic » get a censor's treatment in 
Toronto. Ail of us hâve world-wide responsibilities. We could move 
head-quarters overnight anywhere in the world with téléphone and 
airport. . . Massey-Ferguson is one of North America's first and 
purest examples of a truly multinational corporation ». 
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At a Conférence at Loyola University in Chicago, Mr. John A. 
Belford, a Vice-Président of Massey-Ferguson gave a very frank exposition 
of the firm's methods for supervising and guiding its labour-relations 
policy in 33 plants in 10 countries, employing 45,000 people. If I interpret 
the message of his paper correctly, the basic point was that the firm on 
the basis of its written policy, which must be regarded as « inviolate as 
far as this is within the power of management », will not grant in one 
country what it refuses in another. He described three basic principles of 
this policy which indeed, in certain countries, would mean undeniable 
progress in their industrial relations Systems : 
— collective agreements are to be for fixed terms and must proscribe 
interest disputes for their duration ; 
— interest disputes should be resolved by negotiations, conciliation, 
médiation, third-party fact-finding, or économie action and rights 
disputes should be resolved by acceptance of management décision 
or by arbitration or other forms of adjudication ; 
— management should take the initiative in industrial relations, and 
collective bargaining structure should facilitate such initiative. 
However Mr. Belford also said this : 
«The written policy must recognize that at times, within certain 
jurisdictions, a point of [corporate industrial relations] policy cannot 
be invoked because of law or other environmental conditions. In thèse 
circumstances, it is management's task to identify and to surmount 
it if possible... the essence of management is to make things happen 
by coping with the environment. By 'cope' I mean not only to engage 
and contend successfully with the environment, but also to influence 
it - by management example and responsible participation in affairs 
of the community». 
According to the source 12 from which I am quoting — and quite 
typically — the « European contributors . . . construed thèse comments 
as a plea for intervention by the multinational corporations in ail levels 
of domestic politics of the host nation. Conférées from the EEC countries 
also chided Mr. Belford for discussing corporate needs without référence to 
the needs of the rank-and-file personnel at the diverse operating sites >. 
It is indeed this fear of intervention of the multinational corporations 
« in ail levels of domestic politics » which led the European unions to 
press upon their governments the need to assess and reassess their attitudes 
to multinational corporations. However, to this point Raymond Vernon 
12 Western European Labour and the American Corporation, edited by KAMIN, 
Alfred, BNA Books, Washington, D.C., 1969. 
78 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 1 
remarks quite correctly13 : 
« Few governments would be able to say precisely how and when 
they expect the global interest of the enterprise to conflict with the 
national interest of the economy ; many of the illustrations used to 
document the fear are patently exceptional or farfetched. But as long 
as the multinational enterprise has the power, difficult or improbable 
though its use may sometimes be, to dry up technology or expoit 
technicians or drain off capital or shift profits or alter priées or allocate 
markets, there is a latent or active tension associated with its présence. 
As long as they are predominantly headed by U.S. firms, there is 
also the fear that they may be the instrument of U.S. policy. For some 
governments the tension can be tolerated perfectly well, but for others 
the sensé of loss of control has been more difficult to abide». 
Thèse tensions are undoubtedly mounting in Europe, nourished by 
the ambivalence of government attitudes towards the phenomenon of 
the multinational corporations. Typical for the présent trend in Europe 
are undoubtedly the attempts to corne to grips with the very elusiveness 
of the phenomenon and to bring it under domestic and international law 
and agreement ; viz., the efforts to bring about législation on the « Euro-
pean Company » envisaged and under study by the European Economie 
Committee of the EEC. Typical are also the efforts of national trade 
unions centres in Europe to convince their governments to assess or 
reassess their attitudes towards multinational corporations, as exemplified 
by the récent décision of the British National Economie Development 
Council upon the request to the British TUC to study the impact of the 
multinational corporations and the proposed législation on the European 
Company in view of the impending negotiations on the entry of the 
United Kingdom into the EEC. Typical are also the efforts of the various 
union centres to put pressure on their governments to use whatever légal 
powers they hâve to project labour protection policies into the multinational 
corporations. As an example may hère serve the décision of the Belgian 
government to make the acquisition of Belgium's largest electrical manu-
facturing firm (ACEC) by Westinghouse — which is part of a giant 
plan for a European holding company under Westinghouse leadership — 
conditional on maintenance of employment, no dismissals, rétention of 
the company's Belgian statutes, rétention of the Belgian management and 
no transfer of the ACEC'S research laboratories abroad 14. 
13 VERNON, Raymond, op. cit., p. 117. 
14 Nevertheless, at the end of September 1970 a strike took place in the 
ACEC plants caused by the anxieties of the work force about expected rationaliz-
ation changes. The strike ended with an agreement on job security, wage parity 
with the Belgian plants for identical jobs, individual merit increases under trade 
union control of merit rate payments and promotions. 
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As to collective bargaining goals with référence to multinational 
corporations, I believe that the following list established by the First 
European Autoworkers' Conférence (IMF) in December 1969, can be 
regarded as characteristic (those in italics hâve been designated as 
priorities) : 40-hour work week ; guaranteed annual wage ; security of 
employment ; equal rights for women workers ; harmonization of rest and 
relief time ; trade union controls of speeds ; improved holidays and 
holiday pay ; adéquate retirement pensions ; trade union rights in the 
shop ; improved vocational training ; paid educational and cultural leave ; 
protection of older workers. 
As you will note, this list essentially emphasizes equalization and 
standardization of working conditions and fringe benefits. It is silent on 
wage détermination, although the preceding discussion clearly indicates 
growing interest also in this matter. Indeed « wage parity » has in some 
quarters been noted as a goal, but hère it would be exceedingly difficult to 
establish under European conditions what such « parity » would in fact 
entail. According to an extensive survey undertaken by the Statistical 
Office of the European Community on labour costs in industry for 
the six states of the Common Market, hourly labour costs for four of 
the six countries (Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and France) are 
remarkably alike, differing only about 1 per cent or less. Belgium and 
Italy are, however, relatively low-wage cost countries, with Belgium about 
10 per cent lower than the highest (Netherlands) and Italy 20 per cent. 
On the other hand, looking at the structure of the hourly labour costs, 
the breakdown between direct wages and nine other factors of wage 
costs produces startling différences : direct wages are 54.0 per cent for 
workers in Italy, but 71.3 per cent in Luxembourg. Social security contri-
butions alone for workers in France represent 23.5 per cent of total hourly 
labour cost, 26.3 per cent in Italy but a low of 14.4 per cent in Germany. 
Such global figures naturally hide wide disparities between industries and 
within industries. It is nevertheless quite obvious that any discussion on 
« wage parity » would hâve to take into considération the great variety 
of the cost of social security and labour standards législation. In any case, 
at least for the European automotive industry, the wage détermination 
issue seems, at this time, not to be the principal international concern. 
On the other hand, it seems very likely that European labour history 
will repeat itself at the international level, and before the unions corne to 
grips with true international collective bargaining they will exert their 
political power to obtain the extension and equalization of labour standards 
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législation within the possibly widening framework of the European 
Economie Community 15. 
But behind that looms a far greater issue : the projection of the 
institutions and policies of the goal-directed national welfare state into 
the international community. Taking into considération that the private 
sectors of thèse countries certainly hâve, by no means, suffered by the 
économie growth and socal stability which thèse policies hâve engendered 
at the national level, the multinational corporations may well find it to 
their advantage, politically and economically, not to hinder such a 
development. 
Indeed, it may well be the somewhat ironical, but nevertheless quite 
feasible, effect to the growth and pénétration of the multinational cor-
porations throughout the European welfare states that will force thèse 
states to divest themselves more and more of the vestiges of their natio-
nalistic and inward-directed character and in the response to the challenge 
of the multinational corporations move increasingly to international 
intégration. 
In his Yale lectures of 1958, which I quoted at the beginning, Gunnar 
Myrdal said : 
«As was the case in the individual welfare states, when they moved 
towards closer intégration, so in the world at large this process of 
international intégration would need the impetus of économie progress ». 
15 The ICFTU as a world-body presses naturally for extension within a wider 
framework than the European Economie Community. In a statement on behalf 
of the ICFTU by Dr. H. MAIER before the subcommittee on foreign économie policy 
of the Joint Economie Committee of the United States Congress on July 28, 1970, 
the following was indicated : 
"What we believe is required so far as governmental action is concerned, 
is an international instrument outlining obligations of multinational companies 
towards governments and trade unions and which establishes "rules of the game" 
for international movements of long-term capital. 
"The instrument should include clauses making it compulsory for the com-
panies to abide by ILO principles and, in particular, international conventions gua-
ranteeing freedom of association and the right of workers to organise and engage 
in collective bargaining. It should furthermore call for compliance with ail other 
ILO conventions, whether or not they hâve been ratified by the governments of the 
countries in which the company may be operating... 
"The problems calling for international control... are evidently multiple and 
overlapping. They involve économie and social questions, trade union freedom 
and basic human rights, as well as problems of international trade, investment 
and monetary affairs. It is, therefore clear that no single intergovernmental 
agency could be possibly compétent to deal with the élaboration and application 
of the kind of international instrument required to regulate the opérations of 
multinational companies. The initiative may well be taken by the ILO but it 
would be natural and important for other agencies like GATT, the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the UN Conférence on Trade and Develop-
ment as well as the OCED to join in a common effort to establish an international 
instrument." 
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If we are prepared — and much évidence points towards this — 
to see in the multinational diversified corporations an instrument of écono-
mie progress geared to the second half of the 20th century — as the 
ICFTU working paperput it — then whether thèse corporations are 
conscious of it or not, whether they wish it or not, whether they resist 
it or not, the very tensions which they hâve created and will still create 
could well be one of the most important motivating forces to project the 
national goal-directed welfare state into wider multinational communities. 
This seems to me the trend which the challenge of the multinational 
corporation has created in Europe. « Le défi américain » is being answered 
by « le défi européen ». And in this « défi » the power of the European 
trade unions — despite their présent difficulties and crises — should not 
be underestimated. 
LES ENTREPRISES MULTINATIONALES ET 
LES RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL : L'APPROCHE EUROPÉENNE 
La société multinationale a-t-elle posé un problème d'adaptation aux divers 
systèmes de relations industrielles en Europe ces vingt-cinq dernières années, et 
comment le mouvement ouvrier a-t-il réagi ? 
Il convient de souligner trois points au sujet de la société multinationale ou 
internationale : la croissance de la société multinationale, phénomène typique des 
années soixante, n'est pas tant une expansion numérique qu'une accélération du 
rythme d'accroissement des investissements, de la production et des ventes. Il est 
concevable que d'ici vingt ans le volume du secteur des sociétés internationales 
corresponde au produit national brut des États-Unis. 
La nature même de l'administration s'est modifiée. Celle des filiales a perdu 
son caractère « plénipotentiaires ». Le pouvoir de décision plus ou moins grand 
qu'on laisse à ces dernières n'est plus une question de relations extérieures, mais 
une question de politique centrale. La gestion peut de ce fait assumer un caractère 
véritablement international là où la nationalité des directeurs locaux importe peu 
et quand les divers directeurs nationaux de sociétés internationales s'identifient 
entre eux de plus en plus étroitement plutôt qu'avec leurs confrères du même pays. 
L'expansion rapide de la société multinationale, associée au changement de 
structure et de nature de l'administration, va directement à rencontre du dévelop-
pement concurrent et de la notion « d'État-providence ». 
Considérons le rôle joué par le mouvement syndical européen et ses alliés 
politiques dans l'expansion de l'État-providence. Nous saisirons du même coup les 
craintes qu'a suscité le caractère « insaisissable » de la société internationale au 
regard des politiques et institutions nationales. Ces sociétés échappent largement 
à la souveraineté des États et une sorte de vide s'est formé dans le domaine de la 
législation et de la réglementation. Ce vide doit être comblé. 
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Les syndicats affiliés à la CISL et les secrétariats professionnels internationaux 
qui leur sont associés et qui groupent le gros des travailleurs syndiqués de l'Europe, 
ont adopté au neuvième congrès mondial de la CISL une résolution visant à ce que 
les priorités de planification économique nationale soient respectées ; que les fu-
sions de sociétés soient soumises à l'approbation des autorités publiques ; que toutes 
les mesures soient prises à temps pour éviter les avatars sociaux résultant de chan-
gements de structure et de la fermeture d'usines ; qu'un contrôle démocratique soit 
établi à chaque palier de décision et que les lois ou règlements nouveaux régissant 
les activités internationales, régionales ou nationales des sociétés multinationales 
s'inspirent des exigences du progrès social maximum dans une économie équilibrée. 
Le plan de mise en œuvre de la résolution de la CISL présente trois approches 
stratégiques : changements qu'il faudrait apporter aux structures mêmes des orga-
nisations syndicales, modifications aux méthodes de négociation collective et de 
règlement des conflits du travail, et, enfin, adaptations à obtenir de la législation 
nationale et de la législation internationale ainsi que des organisations intergou-
vernementales afin de combler « le vacuum constaté en matière de législation et 
de réglementation » concernant les sociétés multinationales. 
Le pionnier dans le domaine de l'adaptation des structures des syndicats aux 
entreprises industrielles multinationales est, à n'en pas douter, la Fédération inter-
nationale des métallurgistes (FIM). Dans le secteur automobile de la FIM, on a 
créé des conseils par entreprise, à l'échelle mondiale, par exemple Ford, General 
Motors, Chrysler et Volkswagen-Benz pour commencer, auxquels s'ajoutent la 
British Leyland Motors et conjointement Toyota et Nissan. 
Dans le domaine de l'électricité et de l'électronique, en raison du plus grand 
nombre de sociétés, la FIM a procédé un peu différemment, avec « des comités de 
compagnies multinationales » qui semblent avoir une orientation plus régionale. 
Ces changements et ces adaptations en matière d'organisation, tant au niveau 
des fédérations internationales de centres nationaux qu'au niveau des syndicats 
affiliés, visent essentiellement au même but, à savoir l'internationalisation de la 
stratégie syndicale d'abord au plan national en ce qui concerne la négociation 
collective et le règlement des conflits, puis sur les plans national et international 
en vue d'obtenir une législation nationale et internationale qui assure une protection 
légale. 
Nous sommes encore loin de la véritable négociation mixte internationale avec 
des sociétés multi-nationales. Dans certains cas, toutefois, des représentants syn-
dicaux ont pu traiter directement avec les cadres supérieurs de sociétés multina-
tionales. On met également au point certaines techniques qui, n'impliquant aucune 
négociation de type international, sont nées de situations locales spécifiques et se 
sont ensuite internationalisées par une tentative de généralisation des points en 
litige à l'ensemble des filiales des différents pays. Cette technique est utilisée avec 
grand succès par la Fédération internationale des travailleurs du pétrole et de la 
chimie (FIPC) dons le cas de la compagnie multinationale de verre de Saint-Gobain. 
Ce sera là peut-être un précédent typique. Toutefois la FIPC a peu de chances d'être 
un modèle que puissent adopter un grand nombre d'industries, étant donné que son 
activité s'exerce dans le cadre d'une industrie bien intégrée, à capital puissant, où 
la syndicalisation est relativement facile. Le succès d'une technique semblable dépend 
d'une action solidaire fortement disciplinée et synchronisée. 
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L'internationalisation de la stratégie syndicale vis-à-vis des sociétés multinatio-
nales suppose 1) une étude fouillée de la situation économique, des tendances de 
l'expansion, de la situation particulière des sociétés et de leurs filiales, la connais-
sance de leurs relations mutuelles, de l'expansion du profit, des conditions de salaire 
et de travail ; autant d'aspects qui pourraient faire l'objet d'une compilation et 
d'une revision constante par des ordinateurs ; 
2) la transmission rapide de ces informations aux syndicats qui sont impliqués 
dans des négociations, la coordination des politiques et stratégies utilisées dans 
chaque situation, en d'autres termes, l'internationalisation des négociations menées 
dans chaque pays ; 
3) des occasions de rencontre plus nombreuses avec les dirigeants des sociétés 
multinationales, sinon pour une négociation directe, du moins pour examiner certaines 
questions et s'entendre sur des principes de base. 
4) la coopération des gouvernements à la création et à l'expansion d'institutions 
qui permettront de faire disparaître les lacunes actuelles de la législation non 
seulement au niveau national mais surtout international. 
Afin de mettre en route le programme de recherche intensif et permanent 
dont il est question, il faudra que les organismes syndicaux à l'échelon national 
modifient du tout au tout leurs façons de penser et leur attitude vis-à-vis des orga-
nisations internationales. 
Les syndicats, et à cet égard aussi les gouvernements, ont beaucoup de mal à 
obtenir des renseignements sur les politiques des sociétés multinationales. La plupart 
des syndicats européens ont réussi, soit par voie législative, soit par voie de conven-
tions collectives, à mettre leur poids dans les décisions prises. Ce qu'ils craignent 
le plus, c'est une administration « absente » qui se déroberait à leur influence. La 
crainte de voir les sociétés multinationales intervenir dans les politiques nationales 
a conduit les syndicats européens à faire pression sur leurs gouvernements respectifs 
afin qu'ils définissent et redéfinissent encore leur position vis-à-vis des sociétés 
multinationales. L'attitude ambivalente des sphères gouvernementales vis-à-vis du 
phénomène des sociétés multinationales est une source croissante de tension en 
Europe. La tendance européenne actuelle consiste essentiellement à vouloir s'atta-
quer au caractère quasi insaisissable du phénomène afin de le soumettre à la légis-
lation et aux accords nationaux et internationaux. 
La première conférence européenne des Travailleurs de l'automobile qui s'est 
tenue en décembre 1969 a traité des objectifs précis de la négociation collective. On y 
a insisté sur l'égalisation et la normalisation des conditions de travail et des avantages 
sociaux. On a établi les priorités suivantes : sécurité d'emploi, égalité des droits 
des femmes, enfin, droits syndicaux dans l'atelier. 
Il est probable qu'avant que les syndicats ne s'attaquent à la véritable négociation 
collective internationale, ils useront de leur puissance politique afin d'obtenir 
l'extension et l'uniformisation des lois touchant les normes du travail dans le cadre, 
qui sera peut-être élargi, de la Communauté économique européenne. 
